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Estimating Parametric Loss Aversion with Prospect Theory: Recognising and Dealing
with Size Dependence.
Abstract
Parameteric identification of loss aversion requires either the imposition of rotational symmetry
on the utility function or a point dependent normalization condition. In this paper, we propose a
new approach in which point dependence is reduced by integration over normalization points. To
illustrate our approach, we consider a sample of Ghanaian farmers’risk preferences over the gain, loss
and mixed domains. Using Bayesian econometric methods, we find support for Prospect Theory albeit
with substantial behavioral variation across individuals plus mild overweighting of losses compared to
gains. We also show that the majority of respondents are mildly loss averse especially as the size of
the payoffs increase.
Key Words: Prospect Theory; Loss Aversion; Hierachical Bayes Methods.
JEL: C93, D81, Q16.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose an approach to estimating loss aversion that recognises that loss aversion
cannot be divorced by the scale/size of the gains and losses being compared. We make explicit that,
in general, loss aversion cannot be decoupled from the scale of losses versus gains without imposing
restrictions that may not be supported by data. A potential solution to this problem is to aggregate
over scales to arrive at a global measure of loss aversion. In our empirical study, we demonstrate and
provide practical guidance on how to undertake calculations to that purpose. Our approach requires
no consideration of scale prior to estimation, but it makes clear that scale is, in general, necessary for
ex-post interpretation of loss aversion measures.
The framework we adopt in this paper is a familiar one. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
we define utility (or ‘value’) as a piecewise function governed by three parameters α, β and λ, where α
and β govern utility curvature in the gain and loss domains and λ pivots utility at zero. It is common
within this framework to impose the restriction that α = β. The appeal of this restriction is that it
simplifies the interpretation of λ, typically interpreted as an index of loss aversion. The importance
of this restriction is apparent from the way in which Prospect Theory (PT) has been implemented
and interpreted since Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For example, loss aversion as formulated by
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) requires symmetry for the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function and if λ is identified from a normalization restriction, then its value will be dependent
on a point of normalization unless symmetry is imposed. From an econometric perspective, we argue
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that researchers should not automatically impose utility ‘symmetry’within PT models just because
of the apparent simplicity it affords in the interpretation of λ.
From a statistical perspective, there is no reason to impose symmetry without testing the restriction
first. Indeed, there are studies that provide statistical evidence against symmetry. But, because of
the issues surrounding the definition and interpretation of loss aversion, these results are often reported
with strong caveats. For example Andersen et al. (2010) state:
"...there is a significant theoretical trade-off if one maintains this difference between α and
β, stressed by Köbberling and Wakker (2005, Section 7), so this is not the sort of constraint
that one should decide on purely empirical grounds." (p. 561).
Furthermore, rather than rejecting symmetry when it is inconsistent with the data, some re-
searchers take a different stance. For example, Scheibehenne and Pachur (2015) support the imposi-
tion of the equality restriction;
“In our implementation of CPT, we set α = β because Nilsson et al. (2011) found that
estimating α and β separately can lead to a serious mis-estimation of λ.” (p. 394).
Here, we take the view that symmetry should be tested empirically, not simply imposed a priori.
Furthermore, if symmetry is not imposed, this does not preclude examining the extent of loss aversion,
providing loss aversion is seen as being dependent on the size of prospect payoffs.
We propose an empirical approach that recognizes that, without symmetry, the identification of
λ requires a normalization method along with a point of normalization (a point made by Köbberling
and Wakker, 2005). Specifically, as an alternative to imposing symmetry or the selection of a single
normalization point (which is standard practice in the literature, as discussed by Abdellaoui et al.,
2007), we propose and implement a method that averages over a weighted set of payoffs based on the
use of a Gamma ‘importance weighting’ function. Our approach yields a “global”measure of loss
aversion conditional on weightings selected by the researcher. As recognised in the literature, existing
global measures of loss aversion offer attractive properties however, as observed by Abdellaoui et al.
(2007) they have significant limitations when used empirically. As we demonstrate, size dependence is
mitigated by our approach, but does not disappear altogether. In addition, our method also addresses
the importance of ‘scale’dependence in the evaluation of losses versus gains when symmetry of the
utility function is not satisfied. This matters as numerous works that report degrees of loss aversion
are divorced from the magnitude of the gains and lossses being compared. While some literature
recognises this not to be a universal feature (e.g. Abdellaoui et al., 2007; p.1662), we believe that a
clear articulation of this point is absent. For example, we do not find that Abdellaoui et al. (2007)
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clearly articulate that if a comparison of loss aversion parameters between studies is being made that
researchers must use the same "real" point of comparison, not "nominal" values. However, they do
note that numerous authors choose to evaluate risk aversion at different nominal values. Therefore, if
the size conditionality of loss aversion was widely recognised, comparisons of loss aversion that ignore
this feature would not be common within the literature. The issues we discuss are not confined to
a particular utility function, but we specifically deal with two utility specifications: constant relative
and constant absolute risk aversion (CRRA and CARA)1.
This article therefore makes three points explicit that pertain to parametric estimates of loss
aversion coeffi cients:
1) In general loss aversion coeffi cients are size dependent (i.e. the real size of the comparative gains
and losses matters);
2) In a parametric context, size dependence can be avoided by assuming a symmetry condition
but there is no other compelling reason to do so; and
3) Without a symmetry condition researchers must either pick a point (size) at which loss aversion
is evaluated, or alternatively a range of points or some sort of "average" over these points.
Our recommendation is that researchers "average" over the size of payoffs, and do so using a
Gamma weighting scheme, admitting that some size comparisons matter more than others, and making
this judgement is unavoidable in all empirical contexts. In developing our approach, we make explicit
the need for researchers to be aware about their normalization restrictions, and also be cognizant of
the requirement that normalizations require real and not just nominal equivalence (of λ estimates) in
order to be comparable from one study to another. The applied literature frequently overlooks this
requirement, while reporting parameter values that are taken to support ‘loss aversion’.
Apart from the methodological contribution, our research adds to the literature that considers
risk preferences in the field using PT (e.g. Tanaka et al., 2010; Liu and Huang, 2013; and Ward and
Singh, 2015). We employ data from a survey of Ghanaian farmers. We estimate the data employ-
ing alternative utility specifications (CRRA and CARA) whilst allowing for heterogeneity amongst
respondents by using a Hierachical Bayesian Logit (HBL). We also adopt a Bayesian log marginal
likelihood (LML) approach to model discrimination using the HBL.
Our results unambiguously show that the CRRA is preferred to CARA, and ‘symmetry’is rejected
for the CRRA form (though not by the CARA). The values of λ differ by utility specification, although
our approach to integration of normalizations narrows the differences. Moreover, when we consider
the implications for certainty equivalents, we find that the differences are actually quite small. The
fact that we should not necessarily expect similar estimates of λ when using alternative functional
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forms is also something we discuss.
2. Loss Aversion: Definitions and Empirical Evidence
2.1. Theoretical Definitions
Various definitions of loss aversion have been offered that relate to the behavior of an everywhere
continuous and almost everywhere twice differentiable utility function U(z) for which z is usually some
monetary amount (for a summary of the literature see Abdellaoui et al., 2007). These include a)
−U (−z) > U(z) for all z > 0 (assuming U (0) = 0); b) U ′ (−z) > U ′(z) (Wakker and Tversky, 1993)
for all z > 0; and c) discontinuity of the first derivatives of the utility function at zero, with the limits





What these definitions and others illustrate is that there is no consensus as to what loss aversion
technically means (Zank, 2010). Globally concave functions can satisfy properties a) and b) but
whether the avoidance of losses is due to ‘risk’rather than ‘loss’aversion is a debatable point. On
the other hand a utility function may satisfy property c) but have the reverse of a) and b) nearly
everywhere. Also, a utility function can exist that has continuous second derivatives (thus satisfying
property c) yet has most of the properties advocated by PT, i.e. being concave to the right of zero,
convex to the left of zero, an inflexion point at zero, and exhibiting properties a) and b). Definition c)
has compelling logic based on the idea that loss aversion pivots a well behaved basic utility function at
zero. However, if this is accepted as the total manifestation of loss aversion, it has (as acknowledged
by Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) few empirical consequences in terms of the restrictions on choices
that a loss averse individual must make.2
The connection between the λ parameter and loss aversion is not singular and direct. Clearly, λ,
plays a key role in the evaluation of losses relative to gains and we will frequently refer to λ as the loss
aversion parameter or index. However, in doing so, we recognize that there are compelling reasons to
argue that such a parameter need not always be viewed as the sole embodiment of loss aversion.
2.2. Previous Empirical Evidence on Loss Aversion
To date, the majority of empirical studies report values of λ that tend to be greater than one
though a minority report estimates of λ < 1. For example, Booij et al. (2010) summarize a number
of studies that all report λ being greater than one, although several studies cited have point estimates
close to one. Furthermore, Schmidt and Traub (2002) explicitly state in their conclusions that they
find mixed evidence regarding loss aversion. There are also examples of studies that estimate low
values of loss aversion. For example, Andersen et al. (2010) and Nilsson et al. (2011) both estimate
PT specifications that are reasonably flexible and, in both cases, they not only report results that
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reject symmetry but also estimates of λ < 1. However, both sets of results are reported in a very
circumspect manner. For example, Nilsson et al. (2011) state the following regarding the results they
report from their experimental data:
" the full version of CPT tend to underestimate λ if α and β are allowed to take dif-
ferent values. This possibility compromises the psychological interpretation of the model
parameters." (p. 90).
Another important issue with the empirical literature relates to how prior expectations regarding
the magnitude of loss aversion shape experimental designs. For example, Tanaka et al. (2010)
employed a switching point experimental design that maintains the symmetry restriction as well as
assuming that the loss aversion parameter is greater than one. While such designs may produce
estimates that support loss aversion, they also ensure ex ante that λ > 1.
A further issue within the empirical literature relates to the choice of functional forms. Many
studies cite Stott (2006) who presents results relating to the relative performance of many common
functional forms. Scott (2006) found that with regard to the utility function, CRRA specifications are
unequivocally superior to alternative forms. Similar findings have also been reported by Balcombe
and Fraser (2015). However, these findings pertained only to the gain domain. CRRA utility function
specifications have also been employed in experimental studies in the risk literature (see Booij et al.,
2010) as well as field experiments conducted with farmers in developing economies (e.g. Ward and
Singh, 2015). At this point, little work has been done on optimal functional forms in mixed domain
studies, and relatively little is known about how these impact estimates of λ.
Finally, there is a growing body of psychology literature that has begun to challenge the meaning
of loss aversion. There are several studies that have shown that loss aversion need not be present
in data depending on how an experimental design is implemented. Both Ert and Erev (2013) and
Walasek and Stewart (2015) report results that show how manipulation of experimental designs can
reveal loss aversion, loss neutrality and gain seeking behavior.
3. Theoretical Properties and Empirical Interpretation
3.1. Piecewise Utility




z, u+, u−, λ
)
= u+ (z) for z ≥ 0; U
(
z, u+, u−, λ
)
= λu− (z) for z < 0 (1)
where λ is a positive constant, u+ (z) and u− (−z) are defined all z ≥ 0 and are monotonically
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increasing over the whole range, u+ (0) = −u− (0) = 0 and u+ (z) and u− (−z) are (finitely) twice




for z > 0 (2)




for z > 0, (3)
(observing that τ ′U (z) =
u+′(z)
u+(z)
(γU (z)− τU (z))3) have played important roles in defining measures
of loss aversion (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) when at λ = 1 symmetry holds where τU (z) = 1 for
all z > 0.
3.2. Scaling of λ
For any U in equation (1), there exists a space (ΩU ) of equivalent utility functions Ũ ∈ ΩU defined
by positive constants ω+ and ω− such that U (z, u+, u−, λ) ≡ Ũ
(
z, ũ+, ũ−, λ̃
)
, where ũ+ = ω+u+
and ũ− = ω−u+ such that λ̃ = ω
+
ω−λ. This mean we can always ‘scale’u
+, u− and λ and retain the
same preference ordering as U (see also Wakker (2010), Observation 8.8.1). We will refer to Ũ as a
‘scaled’version of U. Equally, we refer to ΩU as the functional space generated by U , and U as the
basis function (or hereon "basis" to be succint) of ΩU (that is the basis is an arbitrary choice of one
function from a space of equivalent functions). Since all Ũ ∈ ΩU may have different values of λ̃ it
makes no particular sense to assert that λ̃ should take a particular value, unless further conditions are
placed on the space of functions.
3.3. Functional Forms
We adopt two functions are frequently employed in the literature. First, there is the CRRA form:
u+ (z) = zα; u− (z) = − (−z)β (4)









Köbberling and Wakker (2005) observe that Tversky and Kahneman (1992) adopt an implicit
condition that ũ+ (1) = −ũ− (1). This normalization that identifies λ̃ means that having speci-
fied a U, another condition is used to identify a particular Ũ within ΩU (and therefore λ̃). Thus,
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ũ+ (1) = −ũ− (1) implies that λ̃ = λ for the CRRA form adopted by Tversky and Kahneman













. What needs to be recognized in general is that
without normalizations λ remains unidentified unless symmetry is imposed. If symmetry holds these
normalizations hold for all z > 0, thus highlighting the convenience of the symmetry restriction. In
effect, symmetry frees the identification of λ from both the type of normalization or the value (z) at
which the normalization is imposed.
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) also propose a normalization which amounts to imposing ũ+′ (0) =
−ũ−′ (0) , if these derivatives exist, or a lesser condition if they do not. If we require the piecewise
utilities or the piecewise derivatives to be equal at some point, equally left or right of zero, then λ̃ will
be the same for any scaled equivalent utility function that obeys that condition.
While attractive at a philosophical level, the Köbberling and Wakker (2005) normalization only
has empirical consequences in the neighborhood of zero (Harrison and Swarthout, 2016). As a
result, it follows that different utilities can be practically identical except in the empirically negligible
neighborhood of zero, but can either be very loss averse in the Köbberling and Wakker (2005) sense, or
have no loss aversion at all. We see no problem with researchers reporting the Köbberling and Wakker
(2005) measure (if it exists) as their index of loss aversion, if they wish. But, it is informative to report
the value of λ̃ that would be derived under normalizations ũ+ (z) = −ũ− (z) or ũ+′ (z) = −ũ−′ (z) for
different values of z.
Importantly, normalizations require no decision about scaling prior to estimation. For any given
specification of u, the parameters can be estimated first and the scaling convention can then be imposed
by calculating λ̃ = λ−u
−(z)
u+(z)
(or alternatively λ̃ = λu
−′(z)
u+′(z) ) where λ, u
− (z) and u+ (z) specify ΩU . In




for all z > 0, thus λ̃ is normalization invariant. Importantly, however, it should be recognized that,
without symmetry, the value of λ that generates ΩU need not correspond with a normalized λ̃. For
example, if a CARA functional form is specified, then −u
−(z)
u+(z)
= 1 will not hold for any point z, and
both need to be scaled at some point of normalization. The fact that this is important is simply
illustrated if researchers estimate λ.
Consider the following example. If one researcher uses the CARA form as their basis and another
an exponential form (u+2 (z) = 1 − e−αz and u
−




), it is evident that providing α,
β > 1 then λ2 = αβλ1. If they can agree to a scaling condition, (for example, u
+ (1) = −u− (−1), or
τ (1) = 1) then for this scaling convention they will agree that both will have to scale their functions
since neither of them obey this condition unless α = β. We note that under this scaling convention
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(1−e−α) λ2. Finally, we
note that it is under the CARA form that Köbberling and Wakker (2005) justify the use of λ.
3.5. Identifying λ̃ under Asymmetry using Importance Weightings
If symmetry is not imposed then the identification of λ̃ requires the selection of a normalization
point or set of normalization points. We propose that choosing these values is relatively straight
forward if one accepts that some levels of payoffs are more important than others when evaluating loss
aversion. For example, for most UK citizens, considering the range of prospects between ±£10 and
±£100, 000 is practically more important than between ±£1 million and ±£10 million. Accordingly,
we propose to adopt an ‘importance weighting function’f (z) that assigns greater importance to some
values (z) relative to others and then computes a weighted average over normalized values of λ̃ (z) ,
constructed from basis utility U defined by λ.




= ln (λ) + ` (z) where ` (z) can be defined in either of two ways:
` (z) =ln (τU (z)) or ln (γU (z)) (6)









dz = λ exp
(∫ ∞
0
` (z) f (z) dz
)
(7)
where f (z) is an ‘importance function’with the property that
∫∞
0 f (z) dz = 1. Thus, Λ is a ‘weighted
mean’of different normalization measures λ (z) where different levels of importance are assigned to z.
Given a choice of f (z) , Λ can be calculated by simulation, or by closed form approximations
(which in some cases are exact). Under symmetry, no such calculation is required since Λ collapses
to λ. The use of a Gamma distribution for the importance function f (z) is one obvious possibility,
since it only bounded below by zero, and provides a flexible range of possible weightings. It also has
the attractive property that it provides a simple solution in terms of approximations.
The Gamma distribution f (z, k, j) can be fully defined by setting the mode equal to m and the
mean equal to µ (m < µ), in which case we have





j where j = µ−m; k = µ
µ−m (8)
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znf (z, k, j) dz =
Γ (k + n) jn
Γ (k)
(9)
If ` (z) is approximated using a second order expansion (see Appendix C for full details) around the

























This approximation is accurate for a wide range of parameter values.
In the case where we have two functional forms (CRRA and CARA), combined with two alternative
ways of defining ` (z) (as in [6]), this yields four possible definitions of ` (z) (which in turn gives four
definitions for Λ). Table 1 summarizes the definitions of ` (z) by functional form (in rows) and
normalization type (in columns) along with the approximation for
(∫∞
0 ` (z) f (z) dz
)
in equation [10]
which we denote more succinctly as
∫
`f . Readers are reminded that under symmetry Λ ≡ λ.
Table 1: Empirical Bounded Measures of Loss Aversion
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Importantly, the approach we have introduced does not depend on the denomination used to
specify the ordering, provided it is recognized that to be comparable and consistent, real rather than
nominal points or normalization are specified.4
4. The Econometric Framework
Our framework describes choice with a random utility model that embeds the deterministic PT
model. Thus, the utility Uijs is for the jth person (j = 1, ..., J) in the ith option (i = 1, ..., N) from
the sth choice prospect (s = 1, ..., S) is:
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Uijs = F (xijs, θj) + eijs (11)
where xijs is a (K×1) vector and θj is a vector of parameters characterizing the systematic prefer-
ences of an individual. F (xijs, θj) is defined here as being proportional to the certainty equivalent of
a prospect. We also define: yijs = 1 if Uijs = Max (U1js, ..., UN,j,s) . The assumption of an extreme
value error eijs that is independent across, i, j and s implies the probability of choosing option i for










We model respondent heterogeneity by employing a HBL specification such that a prior distribution
is assigned to the latent parameters θj . When employing a HBL specification it is assumed that θj is
multivariate normal such that transformations can be used to bound the parameters into particular
regions or give them alternative distributions. The bounds for all parameters were implemented by a
transformation of normals approach:






where Lb is the lower bound, Ub is the upper bound and κ is a random variate with normal prior
with mean zero and variance of one. This constitutes a fairly diffuse prior within the bounds but with
a mean at the center. For further detail about estimation of the HBL, readers are referred Chapter
12 of Train (2009), where the algorithms and related GAUSS code employed to simulate posterior
distributions are described in detail.







a vector of probabilities (summing to one) and zijs is a vector of associated payoffs. The key elements
of a random utility implementation of a PT model are: the utility (value) function (U); the weighting
function (w); and the link function (l).
Our exposition will be limited to the case of two payoffs. Accordingly, denote each payoff as zijst,
t = 1, 2 with z′ijs = (zijs1, zijs2) and define the functions
ord (zijst) = 1 if zijst is the higher payoff (over t = 1, 2) and ord (zijst) = 0 otherwise
sgn(zijst) = 1 if zijst is positive and sgn(zijst) = 0 otherwise
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We define utility in a piecewise form:
Uj (zijst, sgn (zijst)) (14)
Next, probability weightings are decided according to both order and sign of the payoffs. They take
the form wj (pijst, ord(zijst), sgn(zijst)) using two functions w+ (.) and w− (.) (defined parametrically
later on) as
wj(pijst, 1, 1) = w
+
j (pijst) , w (pijst, 0, 1) = 1− w
+
j (pijst) (15)
wj (pijst, 0, 1) = w
−
j (pijst) , w (pijst, 0, 0) = 1− w
−
j (pijst)
The way in which order effects this function differs between the gain and loss domain, such that the
PT function calculates utility as
U∗ (xijs, θj) =
2∑
t=1
wj (pijst, ord (zijst) , sgn (zijst)) U (zijst, sgn (zijst)) (16)
from which we can calculate a certainty equivalent measure ξ (xijs, θj) from U∗ (xijs, θj).
We employ two utility specifications, the CRRA


















where αj , βj , and λj are positive numbers. The values of αj and βj govern curvature within the gain
and loss domains respectively (for more details see Appendix E, Table 1E).
4.1. Probability Weighting
For our probability weighting functions, we employ the Prelec II function





; w−j (pijst) = e
(−εj(− ln(pijst))ηj ) (19)
This function delivers a non-stochastic predictor of utility of prospects using (16). This is a flexible
functional form that can capture "inverse-S" behavior, it can be concave or convex over the range of
probabilities and the parameter values in the loss and gain domain can differ. Support for this choice
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of weighting function is given by Balcombe and Fraser (2015) with the data from Stott (2006).
4.2. Probability Linkage
Our framework needs to be embedded within a stochastic framework whereby it is used as a
probable predictor of choice. The ‘link’function plays this role and we employ the logit form . This,
however, does not fully specify the nature of the link. A common approach has been to equate
F (.) = φu (.) in (16). However, we prefer to use the certainty equivalent F (.) = φξ (.), the reason
being that under the utility specification λ plays a dual role in determining the relative strength of
the signal as well as the ordering or mixed gambles. Therefore, we specify
Uijs = φjξ (xijs, θj) + eijs (20)
Under this condition, and the assumptions above, it is the difference in certainty equivalence that






ξj (u (xijs, θj)− ξ (xi∗js, θj))
) (21)
4.3. Parameter Interpretations, Priors and Restrictions
When discussing PT, we distinguish between the over-arching structure of PT, and restrictions
placed on that structure in accordance with the type proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
allowing us to make the distinction between "strong" and "weak" versions of PT. Weak PT, as
we define it, has the structure outlined above (see Chateauneuf and Wakker, 1999) without any
particular restrictions on the shapes of the utility functions or probability transformations. Weak
PT has reference point dependence around which the curvature of the utility functions may differ and
probability weightings that can diverge from linearity. Stronger versions of PT, on the other hand,
inherit the weak structure but might include additional restrictions on the nature of this structure,
such as: concavity of the utility function in the gain domain; convexity of the utility function in the
loss domain; a heavier weighting of losses to gains in terms of the utility function; and, inverse-S (IS)
probability weightings (in both gain and loss domains).5
For estimation, we adopted a bounded approach to specifying the permissibly regions for each
of the parameters which encompassed the vast majority of estimates in the preceding literature.
For the CRRA utility parameters, we specified α, β ∈ (0.01, 2) and for the CARA, we specified
α, β ∈ (−1, 1) . Given the scaling of the data, these regions allow for quite extreme risk aversion
and/or seeking behavior in terms of the utility functions. For the Prelec II parameters, we specified
δ, γ, ε, η ∈ (0.4, 1.6) which obviously includes the linear case (i.e., expected utility) but allows quite
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large divergences in behavior. For λ, we specified λ ∈ (0.5, 3) which include the vast majority of
estimates found in the literature. As discussed previously, this parameter is denomination dependent,
but our estimate has an implicit normalization "equal utility" at one (a small gamble in the context
of this study), and would be expected therefore to be consistent with much larger values at higher
normalization points. Finally, the parameter φ was specified as a log-normal distribution and thus
contained no upper bound.6 A summary of how to interpret the parameters estimated is provided in
Appendix E.
5. The Risk Survey
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Our study was undertaken in the central region of Ghana involving 384 food crop farmers selected
using a multi-stage random sampling technique. In the first stage, six districts in the central region
were selected at random. Next eight villages were randomly selected in each region and finally within
each village eight farmers were sampled based on lists provided by local agricultural extension offi cers.
Data was collected during face-to-face interviews by trained field assistants from the University of
Cape Coast and agricultural extension offi cers from the Ghanaian ministry of agriculture between
May and July 2013. The survey was composed of two parts: a general survey that examined aspects
of agricultural production activity; and a specific risk elicitation component. In addition, the survey
collected descriptive statistics that are reported in Table A1 in Appendix A.
5.2. Experimental Design Procedure
The risk elicitation component of the survey employed an approach designed so as to minimize
implementation and cognitive diffi culty in keeping with similar designs that have analyzed risk/loss
aversion attitudes of farmers in the field (i.e. Booij et al., 2010). We constructed a series of choice
tasks (i.e. investment alternatives) with two prospects, A or B, that had monetary outcomes, along
with associated probabilities. The prospect pairs were generated with a range of probabilities, and
outcomes ranging from 0 to 10 in the positive domain and 0 to -10 in the negative domain. All possible
‘two payoff’prospects were generated, and all pairs for which one prospect first-order stochastically
dominated another were eliminated. The remaining pairs were next classified by examining the
difference in the utilities under EU assuming a CRRA utility function. All gain (and loss) domain
prospect pairs were ordered according to a "change point" whereby a switch would be made from one
prospect to another for a given CRRA parameter ranging from 0.5 to 1.25. We then selected prospect
pairs periodically as we moved through the ordered pairs with a selection frequency that gave us 16
pairs in each of the gain, loss and mixed domains. The mixed domain pairs were ordered, but not
according to the curvature in the utility, but instead where we observed a switch in the "loss aversion"
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parameter λ (range 0.5 through to 2). Here we assumed the curvature in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), α = 0.88 and β = 0.88. Finally, the payoffs were scaled by a factor of GH/C100 (Ghana
Cedis) before implementation in the field. This was done to bring the prospects closer to the real
world situation in which the sampled farmers find themselves. Most farmers would deem a loss or
gain of GH/C100 to be moderate or small, whereas a loss or gain of GH/C1000 would have considerable
consequences for most farmers.
5.3. The Elicitation Method
The risk elicitation part of the survey instrument was divided into three parts: i) prospects in
the gain domain; ii) prospects in the loss domain; and iii) prospects in the mixed domain. In the
experiment, each farmer undertook a total of 32 choice tasks from one of two versions of the survey
instrument. In one version farmers were offered eight sets of paired prospects with positive outcomes
(out of 16), eight sets of paired prospects with negative outcomes (out of 16), and 16 sets of paired
prospects involving mixed outcomes. The second version employed the remaining eight positive and
loss domain prospects but re-used the 16 mixed domain prospects. The final set of all prospect pairs
are shown in Appendix B.
The experiment was explained in a face-to-face setting with farmers. The prospects were presented
in terms of probabilities of drawing green or blue marbles from a bag. Each farmer was made to
go through three practice tasks to be sure that they understood the experiment before the actual 32
experimental tasks were introduced.
Probabilities were demonstrated to farmers by employing a ball drawing randomization approach
using colored balls. Two bags of different colored balls (Green or Blue) were prepared in advance.
Farmers understood that each bag represented one of the prospects (investment alternatives they
had to choose from). For each prospect choice farmers were required to draw balls from the bags
they would choose in order to determine how much they received or lost as outcomes from their
investment decisions in the upcoming season. The proportions of different colored balls represented
the probabilities of the prospect outcomes if a farmer decided to play either Green prospect (Prospect
A) or Blue prospect (Prospect B).
Each choice task was explained to the farmers as follows:
• "You have an opportunity to decide which prospect A or B you invest your limited amount of
money as you enter the coming season".
• "Prospect A is represented here with a Green bag and Prospect B is represented with a Blue
bag".
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• "The Green bag contains 10 balls. 6 of the 10 balls are white in color and the remaining 4 of
the balls are green colored. If you decide to choose this Green bag and randomly draw any of
the green balls from it, you will receive GH/C900 as profit on your investment. If instead you
draw any of the white balls from it, you will receive nothing."
• "The Blue bag also contains 10 balls all of which are blue in color. If you decide to choose this
Blue bag and draw any blue ball, you will receive GH/C100."
• "For whichever bag you choose, you can only draw one ball."
• "Which of the two bags (Green or Blue) would you choose?"
The example described is shown in Figure 1:
{Approximate Position of Figure 1}
This experiment was repeated until all 32 tasks had been answered. To incentivize each farmer,
they were told at the start of the experiment that one of their choices would be selected at random and
they would receive the associated payoff (though payoffs would be proportional not actual amounts).
This was done on an individual basis (different lotteries were selected for different farmers). No
payments were made within a village until all the experiments had been conducted. We did not make
negative payoffs binding, but simply to made no payoff at all if the lottery selected returned a negative
payoff. This approach is similar to that employed by Ward and Singh (2015).
The payoff incentives given were in the form of soaps (GH/C25), candles and matches (GH/C15),
and candies (GH/C10). These were reasonably generous incentives given that the minimum wage in
Ghana in 2013 was GH/C5.24.7 The incentives corresponded to high (10, 9 and 8), medium (7, 6, 5
and 4) and low payoffs (3, 2 and 1). Finally, to ensure that no farmer got nothing for participation
in the survey, each was given a small incentive (i.e., GH/C10) after the interview, even if they won
nothing for the actual prospect selected.8
6. Empirical Results
We begin by examining relative model performance to identify which model specification is the best
performing using logged marginal likelihoods (LMLs) following the method outlined in Balcombe and
Fraser (2015). Details on model performance with regard to convergence and posterior predictions
are reported in Appendix F. We then examine the resulting model estimates so as to assess various
aspects of PT (EU). We pay particular attention to the loss aversion parameter, with and without
symmetry, using the importance weighted approach. Finally, we examine the probability weightings
in the gain, loss and mixed domains.9
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6.1. Model Performance and Risk Parameters
The LMLs are presented in Table 2. Eight models were estimated, four of each utility type. We
also tested three nested specifications for each of these value specifications: a test for symmetry; a
test for linearity in the probability weightings as would be the case under EU; and the choice between
the Prelec I and Prelec II probability weighting functions. Importantly, the LML can be employed in
both a nested and non-nested context and thus can be used to compare models row wise or column
wise.
Table 2. Log Marginal Likelihoods for Competing Models
CRRA CARA
M1:Asymmetric (α 6= β) + Prelec II -6097∗ -6241
M2:Symmetry (α = β) + Prelec II -6118 -6215∗
M3:Asymmetric (α 6= β) + Prelec I (δ = η = 1) -6137 -6258
M4:Asymmetric + Linear Probability (δ = η = γ = ε = 1) -6359 -6324
Note:* indicates the preferred model in each column
From Table 2, we can see that a comparison of columns indicates that nearly every CRRA speci-
fication is preferred to its corresponding CARA specification. Under equal prior odds, the posterior
odds of any given model relative to another could be calculated by employing the eRatio where the
Ratio is the ratio of two models log likelihoods. According to this criteria there is a categorical
unambiguous preference for the CRRA M1 model which in effect has a posterior odds close to one
relative to any other model. This means that if we conducted a model averaging exercise across all
the models estimated, this model would simply be attributed all of the weight.
A comparison of rows shows that for the CRRA function the preferred specification is the most
general model M1 which does not impose symmetry or reduce the flexibility of the probability weight-
ings. The CARA results are similar with the exception that the symmetry restriction (M2) cannot be
rejected for this model. For both CARA and CRRA forms the worst performing model by far is the
one without probability weightings (M4). Therefore, in this respect our results are consistent with
the majority of empirical work on PT which support the use of probability weightings. However, the
rejection of symmetry for CRRA is important in the light of our discussion regarding loss aversion,
since the evaluation of normalized values λ (z) become point dependent, which we consider.
In Table 3, we give a summary of the parameter distributions for the preferred specifications for
the CRRA and CARA forms. We have done this because empirical research frequently uses the
CARA form and, therefore, it is interesting to contrast the findings with that of the CRRA function,
even though for our data the CRRA form is categorically preferred. Importantly, these parameter
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estimates include the distribution across all respondents and thus reflect respondent heterogeneity.
What are reported are the means, medians, and standard deviations for the parameter estimates for
each individual generated from the HBL model.
Table 3: Parameter Estimates & Distributions for Preferred Specifications


























































Note:* Estimates are for the preferred specification (Symmetry is imposed for CARA)
In Table 3 for the CRRA form, we obtain mean estimates of ᾱ = 0.50 and β̄ = 0.70 which imply
a tendency to have greater concavity in the gain domain relative to the convexity in the loss domain.
These results yield support for the general contention of PT that utility is generally ’gain concave’
and ‘loss convex’ (i.e. risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses) which is also consistent with
Wakker (2010, see pp.264 and 269). The CARA estimates, imply much greater ‘gain concavity’and
‘loss convexity’in the utility function.
Turning to loss aversion, we note that for the interpretation of the results our data has been scaled
so that the smallest gambles are 1 and largest are 10 in the gain domain, and -1 and -10 in the loss
domain. This is relevant to both the normalized importance weighted values of λ (or Λ) that we
subsequently report, but also for the interpretation of the α and β which are denomination dependent
for the CARA case.
The value of φ (signal to noise ratio) is generally greater for the CRRA function than for the
CARA function which is consistent with the fact that the CRRA function is the better performing
model. A value of φ translates a given signal in terms of the certainty equivalent into a probabilistic
measure of choice. Therefore, a higher value of φ for the CRRA function indicates that the signal
from the deterministic model generated under the CRRA specification is stronger.
With regard to probability weightings, we note the substantive difference between the probability
weighting functions under CRRA and CARA utility. This supports and draws attention to the
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findings of previous studies (e.g. Balcombe and Fraser, 2015) that show how the findings with respect
to one ‘aspect’(e.g. probability weightings) can be subject to the choice of other aspects (e.g. the
utility function). We present the probability weighting functions in Figure 2 for our preferred model
(CRRA M1).
{Approximate Position of Figure 2}
These plots in Figure 2 are the probability weighting curves for all 384 respondents so as to give a
general illustration of the average but also range of behaviors across individuals. The panels are for
the gain and loss domain respectively, for the ‘greater gain’w+j (p) and larger loss’w
−
j (p). The results
indicate that the characteristic inverse-S shape is supported for all individuals in the gain domain.
The corresponding inverse-S shape for the loss domain is supported for the majority of individuals.
There is another group who are pessimistic in their attitudes towards largest loss (those above the 45
degree line).
6.2. Importance Weighting Functions and Loss Aversion
We now examine how our estimates of loss aversion are impacted by the use of the importance
weighting functions. To do this we investigated the impact of alternative normalizations on the
estimates of Λ and for this purpose we also include the results for the CARA case where symmetry
has not been imposed. The importance weightings we investigate are plotted in Figure 3.
{Approximate Position of Figure 3}
In each case we take the modal value of one (corresponding to the lowest payoff in our gamble set),
but we experiment with three alternatives for the mean of the Gamma function (µ = 5, 10, 20). Here,
x = 10 corresponds to the largest payoff in our gamble set GH/C1000. The middle value (µ = 10) yields
our preferred importance function. It reflects our observations that x = 1 (GH/C100) is considered
small in terms of assessment by respondents, while a payoff of GH/C1000 reflects a large payoff to
respondents (GH/C1000 or around $200 US dollars). To put this in perspective, for Ghanian farmers,
this corresponds to around one years annual income, which for the purposes here we would characterise
as "large" though it may not be considered "large" in high income countries, or indeed for urban wage
earners in Ghana10.
The importance function for µ = 10, gives approximately 25% of the weighting mass to values
less than 3.3 (GH/C330, 66$US), has a median at around 7.2 (GH/C720, 140$US). It still assigns some
importance to values of 20 or 30 (which may arise in some investment decisions) but very little beyond.
How the choice of the mean of the Gamma function within the importance weighting function
impacts estimates of loss aversion is summarised in Table 4.
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Table 4: Distributions of λ and Λ across respondents
CRRA Mean Std Min 25% Median 75% Max Prop>1
λ Symmetrical 0.98 0.13 0.82 0.90 0.95 1.01 1.54 0.28
λ Basis 0.76 0.25 0.55 0.63 0.69 0.76 1.84 0.08
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 5) 0.92 0.13 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.95 1.49 0.18
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 10) 1.06 0.09 0.84 0.99 1.04 1.11 1.37 0.71
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 20) 1.21 0.12 0.81 1.15 1.21 1.29 1.71 0.95
CARA Mean Std Min 25% Median 75% Max Prop>1
λ Symmetrical 1.58 0.72 0.61 0.95 1.44 2.12 3.00 0.72
λ Basis 1.63 0.46 0.79 1.21 1.61 2.03 2.66 0.92
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 5) 1.80 0.78 0.81 1.23 1.63 2.10 5.57 0.92
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 10) 2.08 1.80 0.82 1.24 1.65 2.17 17.36 0.93
Λ Importance Weighted (µ = 20) 4.08 12.76 0.83 1.24 1.66 2.19 173.11 0.93
Notes: Estimates for Λ are based on = utility normalization.
We remind readers that our preferred specification is the asymmetric CRRA, and that we present
the results for both CRRA and CARA forms in Table 4 for illustrative purposes. Comparing across
utility forms, we see that the loss aversion measures tend to be greater for the CARA compared to
CRRA. These results are consistent with the fact that greater curvature for the CARA utility function
requires much larger estimates of λ to achieve similar certainty equivalents, even with symmetry
imposed. The invariance of the CARA estimates of loss aversion with respect to scale (in the sense
that they are greater than unity) and the corresponding lack of that invariance of the CRRA is
worth noting. Equally, however, the CARA estimates are not intrinsically more stable, they are
just consistently greater than unity. In contrast, the CRRA specification has progressively increasing
values of Λ as higher absolute payoffs are given greater weight. Under our preferred weighting (µ = 10)
around 71% of respondents have Λ > 1. Thus, our importance weighting estimates suggest that the
majority of respondents are loss averse (by the criteria Λ > 1). Yet, for µ = 5, there appear to
be a majority of individuals that are moderately "non-loss averse". Most studies do not report the
proportions of those above and below unity, but we would conclude that the CRRA results in lower
estimates of loss aversion compared to many other studies. This is consistent with the tendency of
loss aversion measures to be volatile (Wakker, 2010 Section 9.5).
The results above illustrate that, for CRRA, conclusions about loss aversion are not invariant to
choices of µ. Thus, researchers’judgements about the relative importance of payoffs continue to be
needed when deciding on whether people are generally loss averse. Should we conclude that CARA
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is a preferred form when evaluating loss aversion? Our own view is no. While we recognise the
desirability of removing all ambiguity about loss aversion, such a conclusion would be driven by a
desire to see black and white where there is mostly grey. Researchers’preoccupation with testing
λ = 1 vs λ > 1 may have obscured the fact that the measurement of loss aversion is of interest even if
data does not unambiguously support overwhelming loss aversion at all scales. We believe researchers
should entertain the idea that loss aversion may only be a phenomena at higher scales.
Our CRRA model is strongly preferred to the CARA form and we would not be predisposed
towards using a model that is less supported by the data purely because it delivers unambiguous
findings with regard to loss aversion. The CRRA results above show that for µ = 5, there is a weak
tendency towards being "non-loss averse" whereas for µ > 10 there is predominantly mild loss aversion.
This illustrates that under reasonable weightings of payoffs that the loss aversion exhibited by our
respondents is lower than reported in many studies (e.g. 2.8 reported in Tversky and Kahneman,
1992). Nonetheless, for practical purposes there remains a tendency towards loss aversion at scales
"that matter". That said, we have only explored two cannoical value forms, and that the investigation
of other forms may yeild results that give loss aversion at all scales while being fully supported by the
data.
6.3. Discussion and Practical Implementation
The method that we have introduced allows researchers to draw conclusions about the overall
nature of loss aversion while recognising that in general the scale of losses and gains matter. The
previous literature has recognised that there is scale dependency when assessing loss aversion (Abdel-
laoui et al., 2007). However, the fact that this point has been made before does not mean that it
has been fully absorbed or understood. Therefore, at the risk of reiterating a point that has already
been appreciated by many, researchers should not start with an aribitrary basis and focus on whether
λ exceeds unity as a reliable indicator of loss aversion unless they are willing to impose restrictions
that may not be supported by the data. Since scale in general matters, we have proposed a straight
forward approach which is to aggregate over scales to arrive at a global measure of loss aversion. In
our empirical study, we demonstrate and provide practical guidance on how to undertake calculations
to that purpose. Importantly, our approach requires no consideration of scale prior to estimation,
and can be employed after estimation. Thus, researchers can proceed to estimate their models using
any basis utility and by ignoring exchange rates or denomination (e.g. pounds or pence). However,
when considering the degree of loss aversion (or otherwise) researchers need to decide on a weighting
scheme that broadly reflects the scale at which decision makers generally work. Having decided on
these values (or even a range of values) they can proceed to make assessments about the degree of loss
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aversion. In our view this approach leads to far more nuanced but informative examination of loss
aversion that simply claiming that loss aversion is equal to specific value.
7. Remarks and Conclusions
This paper has principally addressed the identification of loss aversion (the pivot parameter) within
PT. We have discussed the point dependent nature of identification of loss aversion and have argued
that researchers should not automatically impose symmetry just because of the apparent simplicity it
affords. If symmetry is not supported statistically by data then we believe it should not be imposed,
and researchers should be aware and explicit about their normalization restrictions. They should
also be cognizant of the requirement that normalizations require real and not just nominal equality
in order to be comparable from one study to another. The applied literature has so far given little
acknowledgment of this point, while reporting values of parameters that are taken to support ‘loss
aversion’. As an alternative to the selection of a single normalization point, this paper has proposed
that averaging over a weighted set of values as a sensible alternative, and accordingly developed an
approach based on Gamma importance weightings.
Our approach was applied within a PT framework to a sample farmers using an HBL, with the
results supporting a large and growing body of literature that suggests that modelling choices under
risks requires a non-linear probability transformations approach consistent with PT. It also generally
supported concave value functions in the gain domain and convex value functions in the loss domain,
along with a previously observed tendency for the loss domain to have less curvature than the gain
domain. However, while there is a general tendency to support the ‘stronger’aspects of PT such as
inverse-S probability weightings, there is also considerable heterogeneity. This underlines the growing
recognition that researchers should allow for substantial respondent heterogeneity when modelling
risk, rather than a priori imposing average conditions on everybody.
Within this paper, the CRRA value form was preferred to the CARA, which in turn rejected the
symmetry restriction employed in many studies. However, the CRRA form did not favour downward
pivoting of the value function for most respondents with symmetry imposed, nor under averaging,
where high importance weights were given to low absolute payoffs. However, for importance weights
giving reasonable mass to higher values, these suggested downward normalized rotations consistent
with what some studies have identified as ‘loss aversion’. By contrast, the less favoured CARA form
indicated greater downward pivoting of utility in the loss domain. This findings serves as a reminder
that pivot parameter estimates depend both on the utility curvature and functional form used to
model that curvature, an observation that remains true even under symmetry.
Finally, although the CRRA value form is our preferred specification for this data set, we acknowl-
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edge that there are legitimate questions regarding its general suitability. Functional forms, such as
the modified version of the power family (see Wakker, 2010, for details) might perform better. How-
ever, our central conclusions do not depend on choices of functional form. The ultimate conclusions
about the degree of loss aversion may change if we examine more general functional forms, yet the size
dependence issues highlighted in the paper remain. Here we do not investigate additional parametric
functional forms because our focus is not on model selection. There is, however, obvious scope to
extend the analysis presented in this paper to a wider set of functional forms. We leave this challenge
for the interested reader to consider.
23
Notes
1For simplicity we adopt these two descriptors throughout. However, as discussed in Wakker (2008),
the CRRA specification used here is restricted to the ‘power forms’ where the power parameters
are strictly positive since negative powers cannot apply where utility has a negative domain, as a
monotonically increasing utility function over the real numbers cannot be constructed for any power
function more concave than the log (the limiting case of the CRRA)
2For example, take basis utility defined by the piecewise functions
u−1 (z) = (1− esz) 2z + eszz; u
+
1 (z) = z; and λ1 = 1
where s is some large number. u−1 (z) is negative, and has a derivative that is positive for all z < 0
and converges on one at zero . Next define
u−2 (z) = z; u
+
2 (z) = z and λ2 = 2
Under the Köbberling and Wakker (2005) normalisation, λ̃1 = 1 for the first utility function and
λ̃2 = 2 for the second. But, in practical terms the utility functions are almost identical
3We note that u−′ (0) and u+′ (0) are not required to exist for the piecewise utility function in equation
(1). It may be that:
a1 limx→0 u−′ (−z) or limx→0 u+′ (z) do not exist and neither does limx→0 γU (z)
a2 limx→0 u−′ (−z) and limx→0 u+′ (z) do not exist but limx→0 γU (z) still exists (denoted ~γU (0))
a3 limx→0 u−′ (−z) = l > 0 and limx→0 u+′ (z) = u > 0 for finite u and l and define ~γU (0) = lu
a4 Positive finite derivatives exist at 0, subject to u−′ (0) = l > 0 and u+′ (0) = u > 0 where γU (0)
= ~γU (0) =
l
u .
4A detailed explanation of this point is provided in Appendix D.
5Note, only under very special conditions is loss aversion, identifiable and therefore a testable
component of the model as we specify it.
6We also ran models with wider intervals for the probability weighting functions, which lead to
slightly more extreme probability weightings for a small number of individuals, and slightly more
extreme values for the utility function parameters. However, the findings that we present were not
altered in any substantive sense.
7For details see http://www.mywage.org/ghana/home/salary/minimum-wages
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8Our use of a binding round with which to ensure incentive compatability is standard within
the literature. However, there is a significant degree of variation in how incentive compatability is
achieved. For example, several authors ensure that the participation fee is the same magnitude as
the maximum loss that can be realised during an experiment (e.g., Harrison and Rutström, 2009;
Andersen et al., 2010;Liu and Huang, 2013). Some experiments do not enforce the payment for a
loss if this is the binding prospect that is played (e.g., Ward and Singh, 2015). Finally, there are also
examples of completely hypothetical prospects with no effort to enforce incentive compatability (e.g.,
Booij et al., 2010).
9We note that there are always aspects of experimental design and implementation that can be
improved and the experiment presented in this paper is no different. For this reason, we positively
advocate that researchers try the method presented in this paper with existing or new data sets.
10The issue of what is considered "large" prompts consideration of the fact that the degree of loss
aversion may be a function of income or weath, even though the reference point of zero remains for
prospects. We do not explore this issue here. However, we note that were we simply to take the value
functions here, we would redefine large using larger values of µ which would translate to much larger
estimates of loss aversion (though we would not contend that this should be done)
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Figure 1: Representation of the Prospects Used
.
Figure 2: Probability Weightings CRRA Functional
28




Table A1: Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variables Ranges
Gender Male Female
Freq (%) 255(66.4) 129(33.6)
Age (Years) 30-40 41-50 51-60 >60
Freq (%) 78(20.3) 157(40.8) 118(30.7) 31(8.2)
Education None Primary Secondary Higher
Freq (%) 53(13.8) 89(23.2) 167(43.5) 75(19.5)
Marital Status Single Married Divorced Other
Freq (%) 17 (4.4) 324(84.4) 13(3.4) 30(7.8)
Family Size 1-5 6-10 11-15
Freq (%) 150(39.3) 203(53) 29(7.3)
Crop (Type) Maize Cassava Plantain Vegetables
Freq (%) 280(72.9) 322(83.9) 230(59.9) 131(34.1)
Faming (Years) 20-30 31-40 41-50
Freq (%) 319(83.1) 63(16.4) 2(0.5)
Sources Finance Informal Credit Formal Credit Savings Other
Freq (%) 55(14.3) 51(13.3) 273(71.1) 5(1.3)
Extension Contact Very Often Often Occasional None
Freq (%) 122(31.8) 145(37.8) 102(26.6) 15(3.9)
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Appendix B:
Table B1: Gain Domain
Lottery A (Green Bag) Lottery B (Blue Bag)
Task z p z p z p z p
1 200 0.9 100 0.1 900 0.1 0 0.9
2 800 0.4 0 0.6 300 1.0 0 0
3 700 0.6 0 0.4 500 0.8 100 0.2
4 700 0.2 200 0.8 800 0.4 0 0.6
5 600 0.2 0 0.8 200 1 0 0
6 300 0.8 0 0.2 0 0 200 1
7 0 0 200 1 300 0.8 0 0.2
8 500 1 0 0 1000 0.5 0 0.5
9 900 0.4 0 0.6 100 1 0 0
10 400 0.2 200 0.8 800 0.5 0 0.5
11 1000 0.4 100 0.6 800 0.1 300 0.9
12 700 0.1 200 0.9 1000 0.4 0 0.6
13 900 0.2 0 0.8 200 1 0 0
14 800 0.2 200 0.8 900 0.5 0 0.5
15 200 0.6 100 0.4 900 0.1 0 0.9
16 900 0.6 200 0.4 700 0.5 400 0.5
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Table B2: Loss Domain
Lottery A (Orange Bag) Lottery B (Red Bag)
Task z p z p z p z p
1 300 0.8 900 0.2 300 0.1 500 0.9
2 400 0.8 700 0.2 0 0.3 800 0.7
3 100 0.7 800 0.3 300 0.6 400 0.4
4 100 0.3 600 0.7 400 1 0 0
5 400 0.6 900 0.4 600 1 0 0
6 100 0.7 300 0.3 0 0.9 800 0.1
7 0 0 400 1 0 0.5 800 0.5
8 200 1 0 0 0 0.7 500 0.3
9 0 0.4 700 0.6 100 0.9 700 0.1
10 0 0.5 500 0.5 100 0.4 200 0.6
11 0 0.3 1000 0.7 300 0.7 800 0.3
12 0 0.5 800 0.5 200 0.9 900 0.1
13 0 0.8 900 0.2 0 0.2 300 0.8
14 200 0.3 900 0.7 0 0 600 1
15 0 0 400 1 0 0.4 800 0.6
16 200 0.9 800 0.1 0 0 300 1
Note: All payoffs (z) are negative values
32
Table B3: Mixed Domain
Lottery A (Green Bag) Lottery B (Blue Bag)
Task z p z p z p z p
1 300 0.8 -700 0.2 900 0.2 -400 0.8
2 300 0.5 -100 0.5 200 0.3 0 0.7
3 0 0 -400 1 300 0.4 -900 0.6
4 0 0.9 -900 0.1 900 0.3 -700 0.7
5 300 0.2 -900 0.8 400 0.5 -500 0.5
6 100 1 0 0 100 0.5 -700 0.5
7 100 1 0 0 1000 0.3 -400 0.7
8 700 0.6 -800 0.4 900 0.5 -800 0.5
9 900 0.3 -200 0.7 0 0 -200 1
10 100 1 0 0 800 0.3 -100 0.7
11 100 1 0 0 600 0.6 -600 0.4
12 200 0.2 -500 0.8 200 0.3 -900 0.7
13 500 0.6 -100 0.4 900 0.5 -200 0.5
14 0 0 -100 1 700 0.2 -100 0.8
15 600 0.8 -700 0.2 900 0.1 -1000 0.9
16 0 0 -200 1 600 0.5 -900 0.5
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Appendix C:
Observing the second order Taylor expansion
` (z) '
(













and letting g∗ (µ) = αβ
1−e−βµ
1−e−αµ and g (µ) =
1−e−βµ
1−e−αµ , if we define for the log of ` (µ) = ln g
∗ (µ) we
then have `1 (µ) = `′ (µ) =
g′(µ)
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−β2e−βµ + α2g (µ) e−αµ − 2αg′(µ)e−αµ
1− e−βµ − `1 (µ)
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Appendix D: Preserving Denomination Independence
If we denominate a utility function in two currencies P and p, where zP ≡ ϕzp then if we require
that (if they reflect the same real ordering) UP (z) ≡ Up (ϕz) . A utility function U(ϕ, z) that preserves
ordering in real terms across different denominations requires that U(ϕ,ϕz) ≡ U(1, z) for any ϕ > 0
and all z. If a denomination dependent normalized coeffi cient λ̃ (ϕ, z) is invariant to the real point
of normalization rather than the nominal point it requires that λ̃ (ϕ,ϕz) = λ̃ (1, z). Therefore, we
should not expect in general that λ̃ (ϕ, z) = λ̃ (1, z) . The importance of denomination dependence is
discussed by Wakker (2010) and Harrison and Swarthout (2016) albeit it is referred to as the exchange
rate assumption.
For the CRRA form, we see that for δ = 1 where z ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise, we can specify:
U(ϕ, z) = δzα − (1− δ)λϕα−β (−z)β (22)
The normalized value at point z > 0, λ̃
τ








For the CARA form, the value of λ for some basis utility will be invariant to denomination, since
































) ; λ̃τ (ϕ,ϕz) = λ zβzα independent of s.
These results simply serve to remind us that if normalized λ̃ are calculated, they need to be
normalized in accordance with the scaling of the data, so that it is done in real and not nominal











) = ϕnhn (µ,m) any integral approximation
requires scaling of the importance function (in terms of both the mean and mode) to preserve real
comparisons. We note that by denomination dependence readers should be clear that we do not
just mean the denomination as used for elicitation. If two researchers with exactly the same data
use different denominations when estimating the models (e.g. one runs the models using pounds and
another with pence) they need to be clear about this denomination in order to have comparative
results.
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Appendix E: Parameter Intepretation
Table 1E: Parameter Interpretations
α
CRRA :↑ increases : risk seeking for gains, <1=concave, 1=linear, >1=convex
CARA :↑ decreases : risk seeking for losses, >0=concave, 1=linear, <0=convex
β
CRRA :↑ increases : risk aversion for gains, <1=convex, 1 linear, >1=concave
CARA :↑ decreases : risk aversion for losses, >0=convex, 1 linear, <0=concave
γ ↑ increases : S behavior of weighting for largest gains,<1=IS, 1=linear, >1=S
δ ↑ decreases : weighting of largest gains, <1=optimism, 1=linear, >1=pessimism
ε ↑ increases : S behavior of weighting for largest losses, <1=IS, 1=linear, >1=S
η ↑ decreases : weighting of largest losses, <1=pessimism, 1=linear, >1=optimism
λ ↑ increases : weighting of loss to gain for value functions
φ ↑ increases : probability of choice given preference under PT (signal/noise ratio)
Note: IS overweights small probabilities/overweights large probabilities (S does opposite)
Increase weightings largest gains (losses)/decrease weightings smallest gain (losses) etc.
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Appendix F: Convergence and Posterior Prediction
Convergence is checked visually, but also automatically by conducting modified t-tests subject
to Bonferroni corrections, for the mean parameters of the first thousand and last thousand using a
5% level of significance. Similarly we look at the Gelman and Rubin Rhat statistics for each chain
using the first 1000 and last 1000 draws. For our preferred model we also ran two separate chains
and checked the Gelman and Rubin Rhat statistic which had a maximum of 1.04 for one of the
parameters (anything below 1.10 being considered reasonable). Figure F1, gives the Trace Plot for
the latent means for the preferred model, which is typical of the Traceplots for each of the models.
This type of traceplot is consistent with good mixing, and convergent results.
Figure F1: Typical Trace Plot
The overall predictive accuracy over all choices by all individuals was 78%. The predictive accuracy
with respect to individuals is illustrated Figure F2 below. On the horizontal axis the predictive
accuracy is given with the line showing the proportion of respondents with a better rate of prediction
than the associated coordinate on the horizontal axis. This shows that 100 percent (proportion of 1)
individuals had better than 50% (the rate of prediction for random choices). Thus, this model does
better than random prediction for all individuals in the sample. Naturally, the proportion falls with
predictve accuracy. Thus, around 75% of individuals had there choices correctly predicted above 60%
of the time, but with only 25% of individuals having there choice predicted in more than 70% of
choices.
37
Figure F2: Posterior Predictive Accuracy
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